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Abstract
As part of the European Detect and Avoid project MIDCAS three human-in-the-loop simulation campaigns were conducted with 
remotely piloted aircraft system equipped with a Detect and Avoid system flying according to instrument flight rules in an air
traffic control environment. Situation awareness for remotely piloted aircraft system pilots and air traffic controllers was studied 
as part of an evaluation of the operational concept. Experienced pilots and air traffic controllers participated. Data was collected 
for qualitative analysis including observer logs, questionnaires, and notes from debriefings/workshops. In general the situation 
awareness was good however there were also examples of lost situation awareness during the simulations, reported in this paper. 
Lessons learned include how the system could further support remotely piloted aircraft system pilots situation awareness by 
highlighting if intruder is transponder equipped or not and semi-static or frozen information regarding traffic avoidance and 
standardized phraseology should be used to further support shared situation awareness between remotely piloted aircraft system 
pilot and air traffic controller. Given that remotely piloted aircraft systems are new in this kind of setting the result from this 
simulations are promising in that there were no major concerns found concerning situation awareness that would risk 
significantly affect the operational concept. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of AHFE Conference.
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1. Introduction
As part of the European Detect and Avoid (D&A) project MIDCAS (Mid-air Collision Avoidance System) [1,2],
three human-in-the-loop simulation campaigns have been successfully performed with a remotely piloted aircraft 
system (RPAS) equipped with a D&A systemflying according to instrument flight rules (IFR) in an air traffic 
control (ATC) environment.
 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of AHFE Conference
1015 Jens Alfredson et al. /  Procedia Manufacturing  3 ( 2015 )  1014 – 1021 
The overall purpose of the project was to identify adequate technology, contribute to standardization and 
demonstrate a D&A system for RPAS able to fulfill the requirements for self-separation (or traffic avoidance) and 
mid-air collision avoidance in non-segregated airspace. Evaluations are performed using Real Time, Monte Carlo 
and ATC simulations as well as flight tests with a RPAS equipped with a D&A system.The main purpose of the
ATC simulations was to study the D&A system from an operational perspective and the interaction with ATC. As 
part of this purpose situation awareness (SA) for remote pilots and ATCOs was investigated. Specifically, we here 
report on how active air traffic controllers (ATCO) and remote pilots were studied systematically in a real time 
simulation. Hereby we can report results on actual and desired behavior of the studied concept, regarding SA. The 
simulations where performed in three simulation campaigns carried out in Sweden during one week each. The focus 
of the simulations performed was on evaluating interaction between the D&A system, remote pilot, ATC and 
surrounding Air traffic during mid-air collision incidents. The subsystems included in the simulation were 1) Sense 
subsystem 2) Avoid subsystem (traffic avoidance and collision avoidance), see Fig. 1, and 3) Human Machine 
Interfaces. The performed simulations also included studies of workload [3] as well as assessments of the human 
machine interaction, not reported here.
In Fig. 1 below a notional timeline for the concept under study is presented for a typical situation which builds 
up. Depending on the chain of events and depending on simulated pre-conditions such as airspace class variations in 
expected behavior among the participants in the simulation would be expected.In the traffic avoidance phase the 
remote pilot can chose to activate the suggested maneuver, whilst if no action is taken by the remote pilot 
eventually, in the collision avoidance phase, the system will initiate an automatic maneuver. At any time of the 
situation buildup the conflict can be resolved by for instance intruder pilot action, ATCO instruction. 
To provide an example of a typical chain of events the high level description below could help to understand one 
possible outcome. However there are several other chains of events that would be expected depending on for 
instance airspace class or if there are aircraft present without transponders.
1. D&A system: Provides information to remote pilot in order to allow him/her to establish SA. Checks RPA 
separation from other traffics (based on D&A separation minima fulfilment).
2. Remote pilot: Establish his/her own SA.
3. ATC: Under surveillance responsibility, ATC detects potential conflict with an intruder, which can be either IFR 
or VFR traffic. The characteristics of the intruder (aircraft type, speed, altitude, heading), its state (eventual 
contingency or emergency) and flight plan / intentions may also be known.
4. ATC informs remote pilot of potential conflict and provides him/her with an instruction to change the RPA 
heading and/or speed and/or flight level in order to maintain the separation from intruder according to appropriate 
rule. The intruder traffic’s pilot is simultaneously informed via radio.
5. Remote pilot: Remote pilot acknowledges the instruction given by ATC via radio, and executes these 
instructions. Remote pilot monitors the correct efficiency of the de-conflicting action execution thanks to the 
support from D&A system situational display.
6. ATC: ATC informs the intruder Pilot of potential conflict and provides him/her with instructions; e.g. to maintain 
or to modify heading and/or speed and/or flight level. 
7. Intruder pilot: Intruder pilot acknowledges the instruction given by ATC via radio, and executes instructions.
8. D&A system: Acting continuously as a complementary system, the D&A system continues to check that D&A 
separation minima is maintained. If a separation conflict is foreseen by the D&A system, it provides the remote 
pilot with a warning indicating the potential conflict and a resolution solution.
9. Remote Pilot: remote pilot informs ATC on the detected conflict. 
10. ATC: ATC checks the remote pilot warning in order to verify conflict information. If the conflict is confirmed, 
then a new instruction will be given to the remote and intruder Pilots. If no conflict is found by ATC, they will 
inform the remote pilot to proceed as previously indicated. Note: If there would be aircraft present without 
transponders there are a significant risk that ATC may not be aware of them at all times.
11. Remote pilot: Remote pilot proceeds with the given instruction and informs ATC on the compliance with such 
instruction.
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Fig.1. A timeline for the concept under study, for a typical situation. First, there is a surveillance phase and then a traffic warning or traffic alert is 
presented to the remote pilot. Then, there are traffic avoidance including nominal traffic avoidance and an escape phase. Finally after a collision 
avoidance alert the collision avoidance phase is entered. Then an automatic collision avoidance maneuver is initiated and the closest point of 
approach is passed.
An example of how the D&A graphical user interface could look during the simulations can be seen in Fig. 2, 
below. The main differences between the traffic avoidance and collision avoidance capabilities are that the Traffic 
avoidance has the objective for not scaring others whereas CA is designed not to scrape paint. Traffic avoidance is 
performed using nominal maneuvering performance (predictable for ATCO) whereas CA is using most of the RPA 
performance. Traffic avoidance is done by a change in one of altitude, heading or speed, whereas collision 
avoidance is done by a combined optimum maneuver, potentially in both horizontal and vertical direction. Traffic 
avoidance needs to be according to clearance in controlled airspace whereas collision avoidance is regarded as an 
emergency maneuver implying that ATCO only is informed after the initiation of the maneuver and after “clear-of-
Conflict”. Traffic avoidance needs to be commanded by pilot whereas collision avoidance is automatically triggered 
unled aborted by the pilot. This implies that collision avoidance is always available, independent of availability of 
data link, whereas traffic avoidance capability is lost when the link is lost.
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Fig.2. An example of what the remote pilot could see at the D&A system HMI.
1.1. Situation awareness
Recently a holistic framework was proposed for SA [4]. However, the concept of SA has been debated for more 
than 20 years now [5,6,7] and are still under debate [8,9].During this time a huge amount of studies has used the 
concept within various domains, also for air traffic management. Of special interest to this study is that good SA is 
important for the ATCOs ability to handle unexpected aircraft behavior [10].
The SA of the ATCO is of interest for these simulations since the effect on the ATCO having to control RPAS 
equipped with D&A systems is of relevance for potential future technology, training and regulations to support safe 
and efficient performance.
The SA of the remote pilot is of interest for these simulations since it provided useful experiences of an 
operational context that could not be studied in real life at this point in time. Also it is interesting due to lessons 
learned of value for future requirement design, for instance of a D&A system for future RPAS.
Also shared SA between the ATCO and the remote pilot is of interest as a factor for explaining potentially unsafe 
behavior.
2. Method
The main method used in this study was human in the loop simulations. The simulations included valid scenarios 
performed by ATC experts and tested during pre-tests (Dry-Run).
Data was collected for qualitative analysis including: Observer logs by observers for ATCO and remote pilot, 
questionnaires, and notes from debriefings/workshops. Debriefings were held after each run performed and notes 
were collected by observers. Assessment of SA was specifically performed on remote pilots and air traffic 
controllers. The SA was both assessed by subjective assessments by the remote pilot and the traffic controller 
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respectively, but also though questions in a questionnaire and in debriefings and workshops performed together with 
subject matter experts.
The three ATCOs participating in the simulations were all active ATCO in the real airspace that was simulated in 
the study, one with nine years of experience in that position, another with two years’ experience in that position, and 
the third had 27 years’ experience in that position. The fourremotepilots were all experienced IFR pilots. One was a 
flight instructor and Saab 2000 pilot, another other had 33 years of experience as military and civil pilot, the third 
had about 2000 flight hours, and the fourth an active and experienced SAAB 340 and SAAB 2000 pilot with good 
familiarity with the simulated airspace. 
Each team consisted of one ATCO, one remote pilot and two intruder pilots (controlling all manned aircraft and 
responding to ATCO communication) along with an additional “Rest of the world”-position, controlling the CTRs 
and the other adjacent airspace around the TMA, in order to make the exercise realistic with regard to handover 
between controllers. Five to seven one hour runs were performed with each team. There was also an initial reference 
run for each team with only manned aircraft, carried out for comparison.
Contextual information was carefully provided to the participants since potential misunderstandings of clearances 
might depend on certain flights or certain waypoints [11]. The simulated airspace under ATCO responsibility was 
Östgöta Terminal Maneuvering Area (TMA) in the south of Sweden, see Fig. 3. There were three active 
airports/CTRs under the TMA, the Linköping/ Saab CTR, the Norrköping/Kungsängen CTR, and the 
Stockholm/Skavsta CTR. Airspace classes C, D and E were simulated, whereas the true class of the TMA is C. 
Traffic density was also increased compared to current situation to enable assessment of a potentially more dense 
airspace in the future or on other parts of Europe.
The main difference between the simulated airspace classes with regard to Mid-Air collision prevention are the 
ATCO awareness and responsibility, which results in different responsibility of the pilots of the different aircraft. In 
airspace C the ATCO provides separation for all aircraft flying according to IFR against all other intruders. In this 
airspace class the remote pilot (IFR) is only responsible for providing collision avoidance. In airspace class D the 
ATCO is in contact and thus aware of all aircraft but is only responsible for providing separation between different 
IFR aircraft. The remote pilot will thus be required to provide traffic avoidance against VFR aircraft (and CA 
against all) under the condition that all aircraft are known to ATCO. In airspace E only IFR aircraft have to be 
known to ATCO and separation provision is thus only provided between these. The remote pilot will similarly be
required to perform traffic avoidance against VFR aircraft (and CA against all) under the condition that all aircraft 
are not known to ATCO. Traffic information is also provided by ATCO in the airspaces where separation is not 
provided.
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Fig.3. The simulated airspace was Östgöta TMA in the south of Sweden.
3. Results
The subjective SA ratings were consistent with data collected in the questionnaires, as well as the outcome of the 
debriefings and workshops.
In general the SA was good. At a direct question to the remote pilot “Does the information from the D&A system 
sufficiently support remote pilot’s situation awareness?”, the immediate response was “Yes, good”.
During a situation that did not include any conflict and could be classified as normal the remote pilot was found 
by the observers to be very active with the graphical user interface of the D&A system zooming in and zooming out. 
This kind of behavior was common during these simulations. This particular time occurred on the third simulation 
week in the late afternoon the first day of simulation for this remote pilot. During the simulation various scenarios 
were used by varying the airspace class, varying if it would generate traffic avoidance or collision avoidance, if 
aircraft without transponders should be present and the flight plan of RPAS and surrounding traffic. The scenario 
was designed to study RPAS self-separation through the D&A system’s traffic avoidance. This scenario explored 
the situation in which RPAS was expected to operate in an airspace class where ATC is not responsible for 
separation. RPAS was on an IFR flightplan, operate through D airspace on a clearance and would at various stages 
come into conflicts with VFR intruders, all of which are to be resolved by D&A system’s traffic avoidance function 
well before collision avoidance function would activate. The duration of the scenario was 60 minutes but after 28 
minutes of simulation this particular situation occurred, right after resolving a potential traffic avoidance situation
for the second time during this run, but now being in-between events. In the debriefing the remote pilot explained 
the active zooming behavior as essential for him to build SA and he explained how he strived to have excellent SA
also in situations when he did not expect any potential conflicts to occur. He stated that “It is good to be prepared”.
1020   Jens Alfredson et al. /  Procedia Manufacturing  3 ( 2015 )  1014 – 1021 
Fig.4. A Zoomed out view at the D&A system’s HMI of a situation in which the remote pilot did not have full SA.
However, there were also examples of lost SA during the simulations. At a specific situation the remote pilot was 
not aware of the situation at hand. There was a potential conflict. The RPAS observer noted this to bring it up during 
the debriefing after the run could clarify that the remote pilot had lost SA. The D&A system then performed an 
automatic collision avoidance maneuver according to its specified behavior and no collision was recorded. This 
occurred on the third simulation week in the early afternoon the first day of simulation for this remote pilot. It was 
the same remote pilot as in the situation described above and the adjacent simulation run. The scenario was designed 
to study RPAS D&A system’s collision avoidance. This scenario was almost identical to the scenario described 
earlier in its pre-conditions, also airspace class D, similar flight plan, similar traffic density although some variations 
in traffic. Unlike the other scenario this scenario was designed to include the unpredictable behavior among 
transponder equipped as well as non-transponder equipped aircraft. The duration of the scenario was 60 minutes and 
after 40 minutes the situation of interest occurred. The situation is depicted in Fig. 4, below, with a zoomed out 
view. There is one aircraft right in front of the RPA and going in the same direction, and another aircraft in also in 
front but further away going in the opposite direction. The first aircraft to catch the remote pilot’s attention was the 
aircraft right in front of him. He zoomed in with the intention to get better SA of that situation, but never gained SA 
of the other aircraft. As coming to know during the debriefing the incoming aircraft was the highest threat.
To support shared SA between the remote pilot and ATCO we found that two important criteria for the D&A
system is to present:
1. Semi-static or “frozen” information regarding traffic avoidance manoeuvre direction, however needed to be 
reactive if scenario changes and initial manoeuvre suggestion is no longer safe. This enables the remote pilot to 
get new clearance from ATCO since non-emergency manoeuvring can only be done according to clearance in 
controlled airspace
2. Standardized phraseology and information content specification regarding traffic avoidance in line with current 
semantics, however too simple manoeuvres may result in large deviations from flight plan/mission.
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To support remote pilot SA the participants of the simulation agreed in a workshop that the technical system 
should highlight to the remote pilot if a potential intruder is equipped with a transponder or not. This was motivated 
by supporting the SA by the remote pilot as well as supporting the SA by the ATCO through communication with 
the remote pilot.
4. Discussion and conclusion
SA was mostly good during these simulations both regarding the remote pilot and the ATCO.
We learned how the system could further support remote pilot SA by highlighting if intruder is transponder 
equipped or not. This enables the pilot to understand if the ATCO, using transponder interrogation/Secondary 
Surveillance Radar, is likely to be aware of the intruder.
We also learned how to further support shared SAbetween remote pilot and ATCO by the use of semi-static or 
frozen information regarding traffic avoidance as well as the need for standardized phraseology.
Two situations were presented in the results section in which the remote pilot in both cases zoomed with the 
intention of increasing his own SA. In one of the situations he stated that this helped him in building SA but in the 
other situation it is likely that the zooming may have contributed to the lack of SA. It is up to further research to find 
out how to best support the need for zooming but reduce the risk of having negative effects of this on SA. 
In encounters with non-transponding intruders in airspace C and D (triggered by failed transponder or 
erroneously strayed intruder) the ATCO queried the remote pilot for bearing and flight level of traffic to enhance the 
SA and give traffic information to surrounding traffic of the potential hazardous situation.
Given that RPAS are new in this kind of setting and that there are state-of-the-art methods to enhance safety 
within the domain of air traffic control [11,12] when they will be in use and we all can learn from practice, the result 
from this simulations are promising in that there were no major concerns found concerning SA that would risk 
significantly affect the operational concept.
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